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Abstract
We analyze a static partial equilibrium model where the agents are
not only heterogeneous in their beliefs about the return on risky assets
but also in their attitude to it. While some agents in the economy
are subjective utility maximizers others behave ambiguity averse in
the sense of Knight (1921). If ambiguity averse agents meet overly
optimistic subjective utility maximizers in the market lower equity
premia can arise in the equilibrium than in a purely subjective utility
framework.
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1 Introduction
The main goal of the paper is to highlight the impact of ambiguity on market prices in a
static market model with heterogeneous agents. We show that the presence of ambiguity
averse agents can lead to higher prices of the asset.
Classical asset pricing literature relies heavily on the assumption that agents have
homogeneous correct expectations about future returns. Lintner (1969) first analyzes a
partial equilibrium model where agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the profitability
of the asset. It turns out that the equilibrium price corresponds to the weighted average
of opinions of market participants. While bullish (optimistic) investors demand security,
bearish (pessimistic) investors supply it by shortselling. In equilibrium the price reflects
the average opinion on the market. In this setting, Miller (1977) and Jarrow (1980)
analyze the effect of short selling constraints on the equilibrium price and show that short
selling constraint together with heterogeneous expectations may lead to overpricing. Since
pessimistic agents cannot express their beliefs by selling the asset short, the price is biased
upward and reflects the opinion of more optimistic agents. If this trend is not corrected
over several periods a bubble can arise.
This idea gave rise to a series of papers analyzing bubbles and speculative overpricing
caused by heterogeneous beliefs. Harrison and Kreps (1978) constructed a speculative
bubble model in discrete time, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) modeled overpricing as a
consequence of overconfidence in continuous time. However, all papers explaining bubbles
by heterogeneity of agents rely on the impossibility of short selling. This restriction is set
exogenously and is justified by the market structure, high costs of short selling or regu-
lation. The assumption which seems reasonable in some situations is hard to support in
general. Most of developed financial markets explicitly allow short selling, a vast majority
of stocks traded on exchanges is shortable at low cost1. At the same time short supply,
i.e. the supply generated through short selling constitutes only a small fraction of the
market. Based on an empirical analysis Lamont and Stein (2004) come to the conclusion
that ”..the problem is not too much short selling in falling markets ... but rather, too little
in rising markets”. To explain this phenomena authors refer to internal restrictions set by
companies’ chartas or reluctance to sell short. However, there is no model rationalizing
this reluctance to sell short.
In this paper we relax the assumption of impossibility of short selling and establish
1A review of short selling constraints over the world can be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson
(2008).
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the reluctance to sell the asset short through preferences. The reluctance to short sell is
not an exogenously given attitude as before but comes as optimal behavior of agents that
have certain preferences. To model this we use ambiguity averse preference in the sense
of Knight, axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Already Miller (1977) in his paper referred to Knightian uncertainty and pointed out
that ”[i]n practice, uncertainty, divergence of opinion about a security’s return, and risk
go together”. Thus, in markets where agents have different views on the asset at least
some market participants are likely to experience uncertainty and behave like ambiguity
averse agents. We formalize this idea and analyze a market where heterogeneous agents
face risk and uncertainty.
We assume that some market participants are subjective utility maximizer (SEU) that
differ in their expectation on the security’s return while others have minimax preferences
axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). An ambiguity averse decision maker (AA)
uses a class of models instead of one to assess utilities to future payoff streams and commits
to a position only if the expected utility of this position is positive for all models she con-
siders. In this setting both types of agents determine their demand for the risky/uncertain
security by solving their utility maximization problem. Subjective utility maximizers then
demand the security if the price is below their subjective expected return and supply it
otherwise. In any case they hold a position of the security except for the knife edge case.
The picture is different for ambiguity averse investors: there exists an interval of prices
within which it is optimal for them to hold zero position in the security. This so called no
trade interval first studied by Dow and Werlang (1992) arises because the expected utility
of a short and long position is positive for some but not for all models the investors takes
into account. As a result the ambiguity averse investor refuses to participate in the market
at all. This has two implications: First, the agents do not demand the asset and the risk
has to be taken by fewer investors. This leads to higher risk premia required by investors
to hold the asset. This effect has been studied extensively in the non-participation lit-
erature. On the other hand, the ambiguity averse agents also refuse to short the asset
and fail to generate short supply. Thus the supply is lower compared to a market with
SEU agents only. This can lead to higher equilibrium prices. Even though short selling is
not forbidden, an upward biased price (compared to the average risk adjusted valuation)
can arise if subjective utility maximizers are overly optimistic and bid the price up. As a
result an increase in ambiguity may force ambiguity averse decision maker to stop short
selling and thus increase the equilibrium price. This effect does not arise in the previous
equilibrium models with ambiguity where an increase in ambiguity decreases demand and
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leads to lower equilibrium prices.
The result is an extension of the series of papers following the ideas of Miller (1977).
Unlike previous papers on overpricing we do not impose the short selling assumption
exogenously. Here, it is a result of a rational utility maximization of agents having minimax
preferences.
Several papers investigate the impact of ambiguity on the portfolio and investment
choice and its consequences for markets. Epstein and Wang (1994) use ambiguity aversion
and no trade interval to explain non participation in the markets and portfolio inertia.
It is showed to be a reason for underdiversification in Uppal and Wang (2003) and mar-
ket incompleteness in Mukerji and Tallon (2001). Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007)
highlights the role of ambiguity in flights to quality. In the latter model an increase in
ambiguity that is unrelated to fundamental value causes a sell out in the security pressing
the price down and resulting in a flight to quality. Ui (2009) studies a model of non-
participation in a financial market with finitely many different potential investors who
exhibit heterogeneous levels of ambiguity and obtain private signals. As Cao, Wang, and
Zhang (2005) and Easley and O’Hara (2009) they also note that equity premium can
decrease if non-participation arises. This happens because investors that exhibit higher
levels of ambiguity aversion and therefore demand a higher premium for holding the as-
set leave the market. This decreases the average premium required to hold the security.
The heterogeneity in this models refers to different degrees of uncertainty aversion of the
investors and not to their point estimate of the returns of the asset.
Our paper differs from this literature in two aspects. First, non-participation liter-
ature concentrates on the interaction of ambiguity averse and perfectly rational agents
having correct beliefs for the asset return. In contrast, our paper studies the interaction
of ambiguity averse decision makers with heterogeneous risk averse agents. As a result we
do not assume anyone being rational and having correct beliefs. The prices on the market
reflect solely average beliefs and not necessarily fundamental values. All our predictions
about the changes of the equilibrium price are made with respect to the average opinion
and not with respect to the fundamental value.
Second, previous models on ambiguity aversion in equilibrium models suggest that
the presence of ambiguity averse decision makers results in lower prices since ambiguity
aversion increases the premium required by the investor to hold the asset. In our model
ambiguity can cause a price increase. As more agents become ambiguity averse or ambi-
guity about the return of investment increases, more investors become reluctant to short
the asset, thus lowering the supply of the asset. If SEU agents are optimistic enough the
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effect of lower supply is stronger than the effect of lower demand. In equilibrium we get
higher prices.
Our paper can also be seen in the spirit of limits of arbitrage studied by Shleifer
and Vishny (1997). There, rational arbitrageurs refuse to correct a bubble and to take
advantage of an arbitrage because this arbitrage is risky. They only step in if the mispricing
is high enough to be rewarded for the risk they take. Our story is similar: the arbitrage
here is not only risky but also ambiguous. Moreover, given the price is in the no trade
interval, a short position in the security is arbitrage for some models an ambiguity averse
decision maker takes into account but not in all. Similar to Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
overpricing can persist due to its ambiguous nature.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a two period exchange economy with two assets: one ambiguous and one
riskfree. The risky asset is traded at t = 0 and pays a liquidating2 dividend x at time t = 1.
The supply of the asset is fixed at Q while demand is determined by the maximization
problem of investors. The riskfree asset is traded in infinite supply at a given riskfree rate
3.
There is a continuum of risk averse agents in the economy that share the same v NM
index defining the CARA utility with risk aversion coefficient γ:
u(x) = −e−γx. (1)
Investors that take prices as given differ in their beliefs about returns on stock and their
attitude towards uncertainty. There are two types of investors: subjective utility maxi-
mizer (SEU agents) that maximize their expected utility under their subjective belief and
ambiguity averse decision maker (AA agents) that take a class of models into account since
they do not trust the validity of one particular model.
While all market participants agree that the dividend in the next period is normally
distributed with volatility σ they disagree about the expected return µ of the asset. This
2To set up a meaningful static model we assume that the risky asset is withdrawn from
the market and has zero value after paying the dividend at time t = 1.
3We consider a partial equilibrium model and set the riskfree rate as exogenous.
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disagreement might be a result of overconfidence in own ability to evaluate signals as the
model of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) suggests or be the result of the use of different
models.
The range of possible drifts is given by [µ, µ], investors are distributed across this
interval according to a distribution M having a density m.
2.2 Maximization Problem
2.2.1 Subjective expected utility investors
Heterogeneous risk averse agents agree to disagree about the asset’s return. Each risk
averse investor has a point estimate µi for the expected return which he uses for his
evaluations. For expositional simplicity we assume that risk averse investors are optimists,
having a belief above some threshold µˆ ∈ [µ, µ]. From the modeling point of view this
assumption seems reasonable since agents that are optimistic about the returns on a new
security are also likely to be confident about the choice of their model. An example for this
type of behavior was the overoptimism combined with a high level of confidence during
the Internet bubble. The assumption made here is not crucial for the validity of the result
but simplifies greatly the analysis. We will discuss how to relax it later on.
Given the belief µi the agent maximizes her expected utility. Due to the shape of the
utility function endowments of agents do not affect their demand for the risky asset. The
problem of the SEU investor with belief µi then reads
Maximize Ei(− exp(−γdsi (x− p))) over di ∈ R (2)
where p denotes the equilibrium price of the asset and dsi the number of risky asset in the
portfolio. The expectation is taken with respect to her personal belief µi. Note that unlike
the seminal paper of Miller (1977) we do allow for short selling, i.e. negative values of di.
Thus, depending on the equilibrium price, the agent can be either supplier or demander
of the risky asset.
Standard techniques show that the demand of the investor i is given by
dsi =
µi − p
γσ2
(3)
An SEU agents is a net demander of the asset if the price is below the mean return
and a net supplier if the price is above. In any case the optimal position in the asset is
nonzero except for the knife edge case µi = p. Thus, SEU agents are always active on
6
the market trading in one or other direction and generating both demand and short sell
supply depending on the individual belief µi.
Using the mean value theorem the aggregate demand of SEU investors can be calcu-
lated as
Ds =
∫ µ
µˆ
dim(dµi) (4)
=
∫ µ
µˆ
µi − p
γσ2
m(dµi) (5)
=
µ+ k∗ − p
γσ2
(1−M(µˆ)) (6)
where k∗ ∈ [µˆ − µ, µ − µˆ]. The demand of SEU agents is determined by the weighted
average of opinions of SEU agents µ+ k∗ and the mass of the SEU agents in the economy
(1−M(µˆ)).
2.2.2 Ambiguity averse investors
An ambiguity averse decision maker is uncertain about the right model and takes a set of
models into account. Instead of using their own model ambiguity averse decision maker
use all models that they see on the market. More precisely, they build a belief about the
return and if the belief is below the ambiguity threshold µˆ they use all estimates they see
on the market to assess the profitability. Thus, the set of priors used by ambiguity averse
agents is given by
P = {P : xP ∼ N (µ, σ2), µ ∈ [µ, µ]} (7)
Being ambiguity averse she maximizes her minimal expected payoff, i.e.
Maximize inf
P∈P
EP (− exp(−γdi(x− p))) over di ∈ R (8)
where P is defined by (7). It is known from Dow and Werlang (1992) that the demand
function of the ambiguity averse investor is continuous and has kinks at p = µ and p = µ.
The ambiguity generates a so called no trade interval, in which the agents refuse to trade
the risky asset. The exact expression for the demand function of an ambiguity averse
agent in our setting is given by
da =

µ−p
γσ2 if p < µ
0 if µ < p < µ
µ−p
γσ2 if p > µ
. (9)
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The ambiguity averse investor demands the asset if the equilibrium price is low enough.
However, if the price is sufficiently high, i.e. p > µ the ambiguity averse agents refuses to
invest in risky asset. Unlike the SEU agent who starts short selling as soon as she stops
buying, ambiguity averse agent is also reluctant to short sell the asset at a price p ∈ [µ, µ].
Thus, ambiguity has two effects: first, if the price is above µ ambiguity averse agents stop
investing in the asset, decreasing aggregate demand, on the other hand, they do not start
short selling thus decreasing supply of the asset.
Clearly, the aggregate demand of ambiguity averse agents is then given by
Da =
∫ µˆ
µ
dam(dµi) (10)
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Before we perform equilibrium analysis we note that the demand is only positive if p < µ
since all agent aim to sell the asset if p > µ. Thus, in equilibrium ambiguity averse
agents will never short the asset since the price for the risky asset will never exceed the
most optimistic valuation µ in equilibrium. Therefore, the demand of an ambiguity averse
investor in equilibrium is
da = max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
(11)
Then, the aggregate demand of ambiguity averse decision makers amounts to
Da =
∫ µˆ
µ
max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
m(dµi) (12)
=M(µˆ) max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
(13)
Ambiguity aversion has the equilibrium effect of preventing short selling by ambiguity
averse agents. Aggregate demand of ambiguity averse agents corresponds to the demand in
Miller (1977) where short selling restrictions where imposed exogenously. While ambiguity
averse agents are internally constrained and only act as demander of the asset, SEU agents
sell short if the price is high enough. The aggregate demand for the risky asset in the
economy is given by the demand of the two groups of investors
D = Ds +Da (14)
In equilibrium,
D = Q (15)
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and we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1 Under above conditions there exists a unique equilibrium in the market for
the risky/uncertain asset with equilibrium price given by
p =
{
µ+ k∗(1−M(µˆ))−Qγσ2 if k∗(1−M(µˆ)) < Qγσ2
µ+ k∗ − Qγσ21−M(µˆ) else
. (16)
The first value in the above equation corresponds to the price when the ambiguity
averse agents demand positive amounts of the asset, i.e. p < µ and no short selling
takes place. This price would arise in an unconstrained economy with unconstrained SEU
maximizers M(µˆ) of them having belief µ and the price equals the average opinion of all
market participants .
The second value is the constrained equilibrium price when ambiguity averse agents do
not demand the risky asset. Since the risk adjusted return of a long position in the worst
case scenario is negative ambiguity averse agents do not demand the security and stay away
from the market leaving it to the overly optimistic investors. However, they are reluctant
to short sell the asset since the worst case return of the short position is negative as well.
The price reflects the valuation of SEU agents only leading to a higher equilibrium price
than in the pure heterogeneous expectation case. The effect of the reluctance to short sell
is twofold. On the one hand, ambiguity averse agents stop demanding the asset, decreasing
the scarcity of the asset by shifting the demand downwards. This potentially decreases
the price. On the other hand, the agents with optimistic beliefs demand higher amounts
of the asset causing higher prices.
3 Comparison with Miller (1977)
In this section we compare our results to the findings of Miller (1977). Recall that Miller
(1977) assumed that heterogeneous investors are uniformly distributed across
[µ, µ] = [µˆ− k, µˆ+ k] (17)
The riskfree rate is zero and short selling is not allowed in this market. The maximization
problem of the investor with belief µi then becomes
Maximize Ei(− exp(−γdi(x− p))) over di ∈ R+ (18)
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and the individual demand amounts to
ds = max
{
µi − p
γσ2
, 0
}
(19)
Aggregating over all investors and solving for equilibrium yields
p =
{
µˆ−Qγσ2 if k < γσ2Q
µˆ+ k − 2
√
kQγσ2 else
. (20)
The first value in the above equation denotes the equilibrium price that arises if the short
selling constraint does not bind. The second value is the price resulting in the constrained
equilibrium. Here, some of investors aim to hold negative amounts of the security but
are prevented from it by the short selling constraint. It can be easily checked that the
constrained price is higher than the unconstrained.
To compare our results we assume that the set of all possible beliefs is given by (17),
where µˆ denotes the ambiguity threshold and M is the uniform. Using Lemma 2.3 we can
compute the equilibrium price as
p =
{
4µ−k
4 −Qγσ2 if k < 43Qγσ2
2µ+k
2 − 2Qγσ2 else
.
Note that the price in our setting is always below the price in the setting of Miller (1977).
This happens for two reasons. First, the average expected return in our model is lower
due to the presence of ambiguity averse investors. This leads to a lower price in the
unconstrained equilibrium. Second, while the model of Miller completely excludes short
selling, some short selling takes place in our model in the restricted equilibrium. The
opinion of moderate investors that aim to go short is contained in the restricted price of
our model. Since some short selling is executed by moderate investors with belief µi such
that p > µi > µˆ, the overpricing is not as severe as in the model of Miller.
4 Comparative Statics and Sensitivity Anal-
ysis
In the next section we analyze how a change of parameters changes the equilibrium price.
Our main goal is to study the impact of ambiguity on the equilibrium price in the mean-
ingful way.
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4.1 Sensitivity with respect to ambiguity increase
While classical equilibrium models4 with ambiguity predict that an increase in ambiguity
lowers the equilibrium prices the situation differs here. The two main factors for the
sensitivity analysis is the distribution of opinions and the ambiguity threshold. First we
analyze the sensitivity of the price with respect to changes in ambiguity and distribution
of opinions. We study how the change in ambiguity threshold affects the equilibrium price,
assuming that the distribution remains the same. This can happen due to an exogenous
shock on the market such as an unexpected market outcome causing more agents to doubt
their models.
Lemma 4.1 Denote by pu = µ+ k∗(1−M(µˆ))−Qγσ2 the unrestricted equilibrium price
and by pc = µ+ k∗ − Qγσ21−M(µˆ) the restricted equilibrium price. Then pu and pc satisfy
1. dp
u
dµˆ < 0 and
2. dp
c
dµˆ > 0
An increase in ambiguity caused by an increase of the ambiguity threshold lowers
the prices in the unconstrained equilibrium. This result is intuitive, since all investor
participate in the market and demand the asset. The decrease in µˆ decreases the average
expected return and thus the aggregate demand. This result is in line with the literature.
In the constrained equilibrium however, the picture is different. Here, an increase in
ambiguity leads to higher prices on the market. This happens for the following reason.
On the one hand the increase of the ambiguity threshold forces some market participants
into the no trade interval and the market becomes smaller. At the same time moderate
agents who where willing to short sell before are now in the no trade interval and fail to
generate short sale supply. If the concentration of optimists in the market is high enough
they again can absorb the security available at the market and bid the price up. In extreme
case where µˆ is high enough there is no short selling at all and only the most optimistic
investors determine the price.
Not only the ambiguity threshold is important for the equilibrium price but also the
distribution of agents within intervals. In the following we analyze the impact of the
change of the distribution of the agents along [µ, µ]. For example, due to a unfavorable
outcome caused by a shock some agents that previously had the belief µi > µˆ may start
to doubt their model and become ambiguity averse while others keep the belief µi and
4 See Epstein and Wang (1994) and references therein.
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remain insensitive to ambiguity. More ambiguity on the market thus means in this case,
that although the ambiguity threshold remains constant, the mass of ambiguity averse
investors changes.
In this case the direction of the price change depends heavily on the shape of the
distribution of beliefs before and after the shock.
Lemma 4.2 Let P and Q be distributions on [µ, µ] with absolutely continuous densities
f , g. Assume that P and Q satisfy the hazard rate condition, i.e.
f(x)
1− F (x) ≤
g(x)
1−G(x) for all µ ≤ x ≤ µ (21)
i.e. P hr Q. Denote by pP resp. pQ the price on the market where the agents are
distributed according to P , Q resp. Then
1. pcP ≥ pcQ and
2. puP ≥ puQ
One could also think of an increase in ambiguity by means of an increase of µ or
decrease of µ. However this analysis is not meaningful without specific assumptions on
the underlying distribution m. For this reason we omit this analysis here.
4.2 Sensitivity to changes of Q, γ, σ2
The standard market factors work in the usual direction decreasing the equilibrium price.
Lemma 4.3 Denote by pu = µ+ k∗(1−M(µˆ))−Qγσ2 the unrestricted equilibrium price
and by pc = µ+ k∗ − Qγσ21−M(µˆ) the restricted equilibrium price. Then pu and pr satisfy
1. dp
u
dQ < 0 and
dpc
dQ < 0
2. dp
u
dγ < 0 and
dpc
dγ < 0
3. dp
u
dσ2 < 0 and
dpc
dσ2 < 0
These sensitivity results are in line with the standard theory and the economics intuition
carries over as well. Investors decrease their demands if risk aversion resp. volatility
increase, thus, as a result prices decrease as well. Since this effects are well understood we
keep the discussion short and omit the proof.
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5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
5.1 Uncertainty about volatility
In the generic model we assumed that all agents agree on the volatility of the underly-
ing asset. We can extend the model easily to the case with heterogeneous beliefs about
volatility. The essence of result does not change much.
Again agents in the economy differ in their beliefs about the return of the asset.
Assume that the asset is normally distributed according to (µ, σ) where beliefs about the
actual value of (µ, σ) are given by
P := {P : xP ∼ N (µ, σ2), s.t. (µ, σ2) ∈ [µ, µ]× [σ2, σ2]}
Every agent is endowed with a belief (µ, σ) from the above interval. The set of all possible
beliefs can be partitioned into two regions: an ambiguity averse region A ⊂ [µ, µ]× [σ2, σ2]
and a subjective region S satisfying
A+ S = [µ, µ]× [σ2, σ2].
All agents that have a belief in S maximize their subjective utility given their belief
while all agents in A maximize the minimal expected utility. The distribution M of agents
across the interval is now two dimensional and we maintain the assumption that M has a
density.
The analysis for the individual demand of an subjective utility investors carries over
from the single dimensional case and we get
dsi =
µi − p
γσ2i
(22)
resulting in aggregate demand
Ds =
∫
S
dsidm (23)
=
∫
S
µi − p
γσ2i
dm (24)
Using an appropriate version of the Mean Value Theorem we can show that
Ds = M(S) ·
(
µ∗ − p
γ(σ∗)2
)
The effect of heterogeneity in the volatility may either decrease or increase the demand of
SEU agents depending on the resulting average volatility σ∗. For the demand of ambiguity
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averse investors we only need to note that the highest variance minimizes their expected
return. As in the standard literature on ambiguity averse portfolio choice we then get
da =

µ−p
γσ2
if p < µ
0 if µ < p < µ
p−µ
γσ2
if p > µ
. (25)
Similarly for the aggregate demand:
Da =
∫
A
max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
m(dµi) (26)
=M(A) max
{
µ− p
γσ2
, 0
}
(27)
Here, the uncertainty about the volatility reduces the demand of the ambiguity averse
agents. However, only the mean return is essential for the decision to short sell or buy the
asset. From this point on the model essentially reduces to the single dimensional case. In
the same manner as above we can perform the equilibrium analysis.
5.2 N ambiguous independent assets
Already Jarrow (1980) in his paper investigated the effect of adding securities to Miller’s
model. It turns out that the answer depends on the distribution of assets. If the assets are
correlated substitution effects influence demand and prices of securities and the effect of
short selling constraint may go in both directions. However, if market participants agree
on volatility of the assets, the results of Miller (1977) carry over to the multiple asset case.
We can easily extend our model to the multiple asset case. In case of independent
assets the analysis does not change much. Due to independence of assets and the form of
the utility function the demand for each asset is determined separately for SEU agents.
The same holds true for ambiguity averse agents. Thus, the price for each asset is set
independently and the equilibria can be analyzed one by one with the same technique as
above. However, we cannot distinguish anymore between unconstrained and constrained
equilibria since some assets might be in the constrained equilibrium while other in the
unconstrained.
5.3 Different distribution of preferences
In our model we assumed that all agents with belief more pessimistic than the ambiguity
threshold µˆ are not only pessimistic about returns of the stock but also about the model
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they use. This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably but is not essential for the
result. The main result still holds true if we relax the assumption that there are no SEU
maximizer with a belief more pessimistic than µˆ. In this case although ambiguity averse
agents still refuse to go short for prices within [µ, µ] SEU agents with pessimistic belief can
reflect their opinion by going short. However, the overpricing still can occur if the short
sell supply of pessimistic agents is not big enough to offset the overoptimistic demand.
5.4 Market Crashes and Panics
The model we derived can also be used to explain panics and crashes. Those can happen
if heterogeneous agents become pessimistic and want to sell the security causing a sell out
of security. As in the optimistic case, ambiguity averse refuse to correct this overreaction
of the price due to their ambiguity. In this way pessimistic agents can bring the prices to
crash.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the impact of ambiguity on the equilibrium price on markets
with heterogeneous agents. Agents’ sensitivity to both risk and uncertainty may impose
short selling constraint on their portfolio. This short selling constraint in turn affects the
equilibrium price in an economy with heterogeneous agents by increasing the equilibrium
price. While the effect of short selling constraint itself was already known, the paper
rationalize the short selling constraint on markets through preferences. The model con-
sidered here has also interesting implications for the regulation. After the beginning of
the financial crisis a lively discussion has started on how to regulate the markets better
in order to prevent investors to take huge risks and to avoid bubbles. One of suggestions
made by the theorists was to impose a minimax regulation. Within this kind of regula-
tions agents on the market have to consider several models instead one when assessing
riskiness to a future payoff. The claim is then acceptable if its return is nonnegative un-
der all models the agents consider. This imposes a more conservative value assignment
preventing investors from excessive risk taking. However, this kind of regulation can have
side-effects highlighted in this paper. Agents regulated in the above sketched way behave
as ambiguity averse investors in our model. If the regulation is imposed only locally they
might be investors on the global market who behave like SEU agents in our model. As
we have seen in the model such kind of interaction may lead to overpricing if beliefs are
15
heterogeneous. Thus, a minimax regulation although conservative form of regulation may
help to generate bubbles if it is not established in a careful way.
16
References
Caballero, R. J., and A. Krishnamurthy (2007): “Collective Risk Management in
a Flight to Quality Episode,” NBER Working Paper No. W12896.
Cao, H. H., T. Wang, and H. H. Zhang (2005): “Model Uncertainty, Limited Market
Participation, and Asset Prices,” The Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1219–1251.
Dow, J., and S. Werlang (1992): “Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion, and the
Optimal Choice of Portfolio,” Econometrica, 60(1), 197–204.
Easley, D., and M. O’Hara (2009): “Ambiguity and Nonparticipation: The Role of
Regulation,” The Review of Financial Studies, 22(5), 1817–1843.
Epstein, L. G., and T. Wang (1994): “Intertemporal Asset Pricing under Knightian
Uncertainty,” Econometrica, 62(2), 283–322.
Gilboa, I., and D. Schmeidler (1989): “Maxmin Expected Utility with Non–Unique
Prior,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141–153.
Harrison, J. M., and D. M. Kreps (1978): “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock
Market with Heterogeneous Expectations,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92(2),
323–336.
Jarrow, R. (1980): “Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equi-
librium Asset Prices,” The Journal of Finance, 35(5), 1105–1113.
Knight, F. (1921): Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Hart, Schaffer, and Marx, Boston, MA.
Lamont, O. A., and J. C. Stein (2004): “Aggregate Short Interest and Market Valu-
ations,” The American Economic Review, 94(2), 29–32.
Lintner, J. (1969): “The Aggregation of Investor’s Diverse Judgments and Preferences
in Purely Competitive Security Markets,” The Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 4(4), 347–400.
Miller, E. M. (1977): “Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion,” The Journal of
Finance, 32(4), 1151–1168.
17
Mukerji, S., and J.-M. Tallon (2001): “Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of
Financial Markets,” The Review of Economic Studies, 68(4), 883–904.
Saffi, P. A. C., and K. Sigurdsson (2008): “Price Efficiency and Short Selling,” AFA
2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper.
Scheinkman, J. A., andW. Xiong (2003): “Overconfidence and speculative Bubbles,”
The Journal of Political Economy, 111(6), 1183–1219.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny (1997): “The Limits of Arbitrage,” The Journal of
Finance, 52(1), 35–55.
Ui, T. (2009): “The Ambiguity Premium vs the Risk Premium under limited Market
Participation,” Unpublished manuscript, Yokohama Natl.Univ.
Uppal, R., and T. Wang (2003): “Model Misspecification and Underdiversification,”
The Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2465–2486.
18
